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 State Legislatures Stand Up for Second Amendment Gun Rights While the US. Supreme Court 
Refuses to Order a Cease Fire on the Issue 
Logcm Forsey 
Introduction 
At a young age, we are taught that the Bill of Rights, specifically the Second 
Amendment, gives each American citizen the general right to bear arms. The Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "a well-regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not 
be infringed."1 Taking this at face value, most Americans never question exactly how far this 
right extends until they are forbidden from obtaining a license or persecuted for carrying a 
weapon in a prohibited area. In 2008, the United States Supreme Court, in District of Columbia 
v. Heller, acknowledged and confirmed this individual right to bear arms,2 and further elaborated 
that statues banning handgun possession in one's home for immediate self-defense violate the 
Second Amendment. 3 In 20 I 0, the Supreme Court once again rallied behind the right to bear 
arms, holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to 
the states.4 The Heller and McDonald decisions declined to expressly determine whether their 
holdings limited the Second Amendment solely to self-defense in the home or whether the right 
could be extended to other places. 
As a result of the Court' s refusal to establish a standard for addressing Second 
Amendment challenges, lower courts continue to struggle over how far to extend the individual 's 
1 Neil D. Perry, Employer Firearm Policies: Parking Lots, Stale Laws, OSHA, and the Second Amendment, 20 
EMPLOYMENT LAW COMM ENTARY (Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA), no. 7, July 18,2008 at 5. 
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
3 !d. at 636. 
4 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3025 (20 l 0). 
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right to bear arms. 5 Proponents of gun rights have been challenging state and federal gun laws in 
state and federal courts since 2008 and cases continue to line up for the U.S. Supreme Court.6 
Although many gun rights activists believed that Heller and McDonald were tremendous 
victories for an individual's right to gun possession, later decisions have not clarified Second 
Amendment rights and gun activists have been on an overall losing streak in the lower courts.7 
While the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to take on the issue of Second Amendment rights 
outside of the home, state legislatures have taken a different approach than lower courts by 
enacting laws that tackle this challenging issue. After Heller, gun rights advocates such as the 
National Rifle Association began lobbying state legislatures to establish laws that prohibit 
employers from maintaining gun-free workplace policies under the Federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act). 8 Since 2008, sixteen states have enacted these laws9, 
commonly known as "Guns-at-Work" laws, which prohibit employers or business owners from 
forbidding the presence of otherwise legal guns in locked motor vehicles parked on business 
• 10 prem1ses. 
This Note argues that, because of the overwhelming need for clarification and state 
legislatures' proactive stance, the U.S. Supreme Court needs to take an affirmative stance on the 
debate regarding how far the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends. The lobbying 
efforts of the National Rifle Association ("NRA") will continue to establish more laws such as 
this, as advocates continue to put pressure on state legislatures. Since Heller and McDonald 
5 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 20 II, at 2. 
6 Robert Barnes, Cases Lining Up to Ask Supreme Court to ClarifY Second Amendment Rights, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, Aug. I4, 20Il, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cases-lining-up-to-ask-supreme-court-to-clarify-
second-amendment-rights/20 11/08/11 /giQAioihFJ story.html. 
7 Barnes, supra note __ . 
8 Perry, supra note at 1. 
9 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26, 20II, http://hnn-
pminers.com/hr-news/%e2%80%9cbrin!.!:::VOUr-gun-tO-\\::Ork%e2%80%9d-laws-their-effect-on-emplovers. 
10 Debra Witter, Individual Gun Rights, Gun Laws, and Franchising: Why Franchisors Cannot Ignore the 
Controversy, 29 Franchise L.J. 239, 240 (20 1 0). 
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started the debate over Second Amendment rights, cases have been piling up in the lower courts 
and legislatures have stepped into the arena with their own interpretation of gun rights. With all 
of the disconnect between the new state enactments and the lower court rulings, the Supreme 
Court needs to affirmatively decide, once and for all, whether the Second Amendment extends 
beyond the home. 
Part I of this Note discusses the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Heller and McDonald 
by analyzing exactly what questions the Court answered and what standards they left open to 
interpretation. Part II examines the lower court challenges that have inevitably emerged since the 
Supreme Court handed down there decisions in Heller and McDonald. Part III evaluates the 
different approach that the state legislatures have taken to the issue of Second Amendment 
rights. Finally, Part IV analyzes the stance that the Supreme Court needs to take in this ongoing 
litigation in order to conserve judicial resources. Only three years have passed since the Heller 
decision in 2008 and already sixteen states have proactively modified their laws to increase gun 
rights. The Supreme Court gave a limited definition of Second Amendment rights that spawned 
the increased litigation that we see today. Since the Supreme Court opened the door for such 
controversy over the right to bear arms, it is their duty to determine how far these rights should 
extend. 
Part I: United States Supreme Court Second Amendment Jurisprudence 
The justices in Heller specifically stated that the Second Amendment does not allow an 
individual to carry a firearm for any reason and in any manner. 11 The Court determined that 
individuals have a right to carry an assembled weapon in their homes for self-defense; however, 
they noted that their opinion should not cast doubt on a specified group of gun prohibitions. 12 As 
11 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
12 !d. at 626-627. 
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a follow up in McDonald, the Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment is fully 
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Although the Court had taken 
a proactive step to answer one of the unanswered questions from Heller, they refused to resolve 
the dispute over the breadth of the Second Amendment and the standard that should apply to this 
litigation. 
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: Does the Individual Have the Right to Bear Arms? 
Since 1976, the District of Columbia had in place a gun control law that "banned the 
possession of handguns and required that all firearms kept in the home be trigger-locked or 
disassembled." 14 Initially, the Supreme Court in 2008 held that the Second Amendment gives an 
individual the right to keep and bear arms. 15 Furthermore, the Court concluded that statutes such 
as the one in the District of Columbia, which ban possession of a gun in the home, are in direct 
violation of the Second Amendment. 16 To that end, the Court ultimately established that statutes 
that do not allow for a lawful, operable firearm in the home for self-defense violate an 
individual's right to bear arms. 17 Although it seemed as if this would be an enormous victory for 
gun rights lobbyists, the Court did not conclude there. 
Justice Scalia specified in his majority opinion that the Second Amendment ''is not a right 
to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose." 18 In essence, the Court conferred a right to bear arms upon individuals, and then 
limited that right. The justices explained that their opinion should not cast doubt on laws that 
have been in effect for many years and ban possession of firearms "by felons and the mentally 
13 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 at 3088. 
14 Perry, supra note __ at 5. 
15 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
17 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
18 Daniel Vice & Kelly Ward, Hollow Victory? Gun Laws Survive Three Years After District of Columbia v. Heller, 
Yet Criminals and the Gun Lobby Continue Their Legal Assault (Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence), 20 II, at 1. 
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ill,"19 or prohibit firearms in specific places such as "schools and government buildings,"20 or 
impose "conditions and qualifications on the con11nercial sale of arms.~~21 Activists would have 
preferred that the Supreme Court did not include what they believe to be an unnecessary 
"laundry list of Second Amendment exceptions," as an executive director with the CA TO 
institute explained that the opinion created "more confusion than light. "22 
More important than the answers that the Heller court attempted to establish are the ones 
that the case purposely left unanswered and open to interpretation. First, the Court specifically 
did not establish a standard that lower courts could use when interpreting gun control laws, as the 
Court would not definitively state whether gun control laws should be viewed under a rational 
basis test, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny standard. 23 Second, because the Court's 
decision in Heller was about the District of Columbia~ s federally controlled territory, there was 
no determination as to whether the Second Amendment should apply to the gun laws in each 
state?4 Additionally, the Court would not address whether its holding limited the Second 
Amendment solely to self-defense inside of the home or whether it could be further extended to 
other places, such as public parks or employer parking lots.25 
Consequently, the decision in Heller became the "green light" for gun rights activists to 
challenge gun restrictions in states throughout the country. Essentially, every person charged 
with a crime involving a gun "saw the Supreme Court~s decision as a Get out of Jail Free 
Card."26 These litigants assumed that the Heller decision gave them the opportunity to challenge 
19 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-627. 
20 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-627. 
21 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-627. 
22 Adam Winkler, The New Second Amendment: A Bark Worse Than Its Right, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 2, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/the-ne\v-second-amendment b 154 783 .htm I. 
23 Perry, supra note __ at 6. 
24 Perry, supra note __ at 6. 
25 Perry, supra note __ at 6. 
26 Winkler, supra note_. 
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gun laws that they believed violated their right to bear arms. The litigants found support in gun 
rights activists such as the NRA, who began clogging the legal system with gun law challenges 
in an effort to expand the right to bear arms. Unfortunately, the Heller decision had not made any 
definite decision about gun rights outside the home and its inconclusiveness has forced the lower 
courts to interpret its holding in countless cases since 2008. 
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Second Amendment Applies to the States 
In the midst of the lower court challenges following Heller, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in 2010 to a case involving a Chicago ban on handgun possession by almost all private 
citizens.27 The McDonald suit was filed because the petitioners felt that the Chicago ban "left 
them vulnerable to criminals ... and violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments."28 Since 
Heller had not reached the issue of whether the Second Amendment applies against the states, 
the Seventh Circuit originally upheld the ban as being constitutional. 29 In support of their 
position, the Seventh Circuit stated that Heller "explicitly refrained from opinion on whether the 
Second Amendment applied to the States."30 The Supreme Court, however, took the discussion 
much further. 
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit 
and held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the States 
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 The Court elaborated only slightly on the Heller 
decision, declaring that since Heller protected the right to have a gun for self-defense in your 
home, '"a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an 
27 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3021. 
28 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3021. 
29 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3021. 
30 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3021. 
31 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
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American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and to the States."32 This 
decision was important because it extended Heller to apply to state and local laws nationwide, 
while again cautioning that there are necessary limits on the right to bear arms. "33 The key 
questions that had been left open in Heller were what level of scrutiny should be applied to 
Second Amendment challenges and "whether or to what extent the Second Amendment should 
apply outside of the home."34 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that the majority's approach awards power 
to people and the democratic process because "the rights it fails to acknowledge are left to be 
democratically adopted or rejected by the people, with the assurance that their decision is not 
subject to judicial revision."35 Justice Scalia was correct in his assertion that the breadth of the 
right to bear arms can be and has been decided by the legislature in n1any situations. However, 
only sixteen legislatures have given employees more gun rights on their commute to work and 
the lack of judicial affirmance of gun rights has left citizens without very much success when 
attempting to uphold their rights in judicial proceedings. When the McDonald Court 
acknowledged the role that the legislatures play in regulating gun possession, they were not 
making an exact determination of gun rights but rather they were avoiding the controversy 
altogether. The McDonald court, as they had done two years prior in Heller, refused to establish 
a standard for gun rights litigation or to determine how far gun rights extend, and their limited 
holding only furthered the lower court battles. 
Part II: Lower Court Challenges 
32 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
33 Vice, supra note __ at 1. 
34 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 9. 
35 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058. 
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The significant questions that were left unresolved have forced the post-Heller courts into 
more than 400 challenges to gun laws by gun lobbyists.36 Although these challenges generally do 
not yield positive results for the lobbyists, they continue their assault on gun laws in the hopes of 
gaining more gun rights for individuals. Until the Supreme Court takes an affirmative stance on 
how far Second Amendment rights extend outside of the home, lobbyists will continue to use 
judicial resources to litigate gun rights cases. Proponents of gun rights feel as though the 
unanswered questions from the two Supreme Court decisions opened the door to challenging gun 
laws and they continue to assemble cases that ask the Supreme Court for further clarification. 37 
A. Introduction to Federal and State Challenges 
In the post-Heller and McDonald months, federal and state courts struggled with the 
unresolved questions about the latitude and application of the Second Amendment. 38 Since the 
Heller ruling in 2008, criminal and gun lobbyists alike have joined together and "brought more 
than 400 challenges to gun laws, an average of more than two legal challenges every week over 
the last three years."39 Yet, in a majority of instances, the lower courts have denied any request 
for relief in these cases.40 Although these challenges in the lower courts have generally failed, 
the gun rights advocates continue to launch new challenges and do not appear to be giving up 
their fight anytime soon. 41 
B. Standards of Review: How Should the Lower Courts Evaluate Second Amendment 
Challenges? 
36 Vice, supra note __ at 1. 
37 Barnes, supra note __ . 
38 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 2. 
39 Vice, supra note __ at 1. 
40 v· Ice, supra note __ at 1. 
41 Vice, supra note __ at 1. 
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Since the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald did not provide the lower courts with 
any guidance in how to evaluate Second Amendment challenges following their decisions,42 the 
federal and state courts have been interpreting what they believe to be the standard of scrutiny on 
a case-by-case basis. Most of the courts that have accepted this task have explicitly adopted one 
of the levels of scrutiny and have generally "applied intermediate scrutiny to Second 
Amendment challenges, especially challenges to laws that restrict conduct beyond the right of a 
law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense. "43 At the 
same time, a few of the courts that have taken on the issue have determined that a higher level of 
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, should be used to review Second Amendment challenges.44 It is clear 
that, without guidance from the Supreme Couti, these lower courts are left with inconsistent 
rulings regarding what level of scrutiny should be applied in Second Amendment cases. 
One example of the court holding that intermediate scrutiny is sufficient can be found in 
Kachalsky v. Cacace, decided by the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.45 The District Court rejected a "Second Amendment challenge to a New York law 
that requires applicants for concealed carry licenses to show "proper cause. "'46 Using a two-
pronged test, the Kachalsky court first determined whether the law at issue burdened conduct that 
was protected by the Second An1end1nent and then applied intennediate scrutiny.47 In applying 
the intermediate scrutiny standard, the justices concluded that the state's objective of"'protecting 
the public and reducing crime is important and that the law is substantially related to that 
42 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12,2011, at 8. 
43 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12,2011, at 8 (citing United 
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. Va. 2011). 
44 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 8. 
45 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12,2011, at 3 (citing Kachalsky 
v. Cacace, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). 
46 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 3 (citing Kachalsky 
v. Cacace, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). 
47 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 3 (citing Kachalsky 
v. Cacace, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). 
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objective because, instead of banning all concealed carry, the law provides for case specific 
assessments of each applicant's needs. "48 The court refused to apply a strict scrutiny standard 
instead because the justices interpreted strict scrutiny to only apply when laws burden what is 
considered a "core" Second Amendment right. 49 If the Supreme Court in Heller or McDonald 
had set a standard for the lower courts to apply, state and federal courts would not have to 
struggle on a case-by-case basis to determine which standard is appropriate. Instead, judicial 
resources would be conserved and holdings would be consistent throughout every level of the 
courts. 
C. Is Conduct Outside of the Home Protected by the Second Amendment? 
Since Heller and McDonald only addressed an individual's right to self-defense within 
the home, the lower courts have had to decide not just the standard to apply in these cases, but 
also the larger question of whether the Second Amendment protects conduct outside of one's 
home. 50 In evaluating this difficult question, a significant number of courts have generally 
concluded that the Second An1endment does not protect conduct outside of the home, but only 
protects conduct within the home. 51 
One such court, the Appellate Court of Illinois, decided in People v. Dawson that it 
would not expand the rights that the Supreme Court had announced in Heller and McDonald. 52 
The plaintiff had been convicted of "three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearn1 and two 
counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon."53 Plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's 
decisions should extend to protect a citizen's ability to carry a handgun outside of their home in 
48 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 20 1I, at 3-4 (citing 
Kachalsky v. Cacace, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). 
49 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. I2, 20 I1, at 4 (citing Kachalsky 
v. Cacace, 20II U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 201I). 
50 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. I2, 20 II, at 9. 
51 Post- Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 9. 
s2 I Peop e v. Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 201 0). 
53 Dawson, 934 N.E.2d at 599. 
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case of confrontation. 54 The Appellate Court was left with the responsibility of determining the 
right to bear arms in this case and whether the statute at issue violated the Second Amendment. 55 
Noting that the Supreme Court had "deliberately and expressly maintained a controlled pace of 
essentially beginning to define this constitutional right," the Appellate Court nevertheless created 
its own interpretation of the Second Amendment parameters and construed the statute to be 
constitutional. 56 The Dawson court acknowledged that the Heller court had "specifically limited 
its ruling to interpreting the amendment's protection of the right to possess handguns in the 
home, not the right to possess handguns outside of the home in case of confrontation"57 and tried 
to use their own discretion to litigate the issue. Without assistance from the Supreme Court, the 
Appellate Court justices were left to "construe statutes to be constitutional when possible"58 and 
did not evaluate the Plaintiff's right in the manner that it could have with guidance from the 
Supreme Court. 
Other courts have similarly held off on deciding whether the Second Amendment applies 
outside the h01ne and have found restrictions on firearm possession in public places to be valid. 59 
On March 24, 2011, the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim that there is a constitutional right to 
possess a loaded handgun in a car in a national park in United States v. Masciandaro. 60 The 
1najority opinion stated that the Heller court "did not define the outer limits of Second 
Amendtnent rights, and it also did not address the level of scrutiny that should be applied to laws 
that burden those rights."61 The court further noted that a considerable degree of uncertainty 
remains "as to the scope of that right beyond the home and the standards for determining whether 
54 Dawson, 934 N .E.2d at 604. 
55 Dawson, 934 N .E.2d at 605. 
56 Dawson, 934 N.E.2d at 605. 
57 Dawson, 934 N.E.2d at 605-606. 
58 Dawson, 934 N.E.2d at 605-606. 
59 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 9. 
60 Vice, supra note __ at 3 (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011 ). 
61 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 466-467 (4th Cir. 2011 ). 
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and how the right can be burdened by governmental regulation."62 Absent a standard from the 
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals applied an intermediate scrutiny standard and held that the 
government has a "substantial interest in providing for the safety of individuals who visit and 
make use of the national parks"63 and that the statute's "narrow prohibition is reasonably adapted 
to that substantial governmental interest. "64 
Justice Paul V. Niemeyer wrote separately stating that although he did not believe that a 
car can constitute a ''home," he felt there is a plausible reading of Heller that the Second 
Amendment nevertheless provides a right to possess a loaded handgun for self-defense outside 
the home.65 His interpretation of Heller "found that the public right included the right to 'protect 
oneself against both public and private violence,' thus extending the right in some form to 
wherever a person could become exposed to public or private violence."66 Even though he did 
not agree with Masciandaro's contention that a car which an individual frequently sleeps in can 
constitute a "home" under Heller, Justice Niemeyer nevertheless determined that "because 'self-
defense has to take place wherever a person happens to be,' it follows that the right extends to 
public areas beyond the home."67 Justice Nien1eyer did not read Heller narrowly to only include 
self-defense in one's home, but instead argued that the right might extend beyond the hotne. The 
complex question of where the right actually applies was not necessarily being decided in this 
case, but Niemeyer at the very least believed that the right could extend to a "claim to self-
defense asserted by Masciandaro as a law-abiding citizen sleeping in his automobile in a public 
parking area."68 However, without any guidance from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit 
62 United States v. Masciandaro, 63 8 F .3d 458, 466-467 (4th Cir. 20 II). 
63 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458,473 (4th Cir. 20II). 
64 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458,473 (4th Cir. 2011). 
65 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 20 I1 ). 
66 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458,467 (4th Cir. 2011). 
67 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011 ). 
68 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 20 II). 
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become yet another lower court that was confined to applying a lower standard of scrutiny 
instead of determining exactly how far the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends 
outside of one's home. 
D. How Are State Courts Reacting to the Assault on Their Gun Restriction Statutes? 
Ever since the assault on gun restrictions began, state courts have been forced into 
litigation to determine which gun statutes are constitutional. These state courts have handed 
down decisions that uphold laws that "prohibit the unlicensed carrying of handguns outside of 
the home, authorize the seizure of firearms in cases of domestic violence, prohibit the possession 
of assault weapons and 50-caliber rifles, and require that an individual possess a license to own a 
handgun."69 In upholding these restrictions, the lower state courts have followed the lead of the 
federal courts and have been unable to resolve Heller's unanswered questions. 
In 2011, the Superior Court of New Jersey was handed a case that was similar to United 
States v. Masciandaro in that the defendant truck driver argued that his truck was his second 
home. 70 The defendant was convicted of possessing a handgun without a permit and the court 
rejected his Second Amendment challenge to this conviction. 71 Since the defendant was a truck 
driver who lived in his truck for many days due to the long-distance of his travels, he argued that 
his truck was a home and should be protected under the holdings in Heller and McDonald. 72 The 
justices were able to resolve the case without ever determining whether a truck can constitute a 
legal home. 73 They noted that Heller and McDonald dealt only with guns inside the hmne and 
that '"accepting the defendant's view of his truck as his second home ... requires acceptance of an 
69 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. I 2, 20 I I, at 7. 
70 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. I2, 201 I, at 2. 
71 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. I 2, 20 I 1, at 2 (citing State v. 
Robinson, 20I 1 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 (App. Div. Aug. 23,201 I). 
72 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 20 I 1, at 2. 
73 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. I 2, 2011, at 2. 
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expansive definition of the word 'home. "'74 In an effort to avoid deciding how far gun rights 
extend, the New Jersey Superior Court left the issue to be decided at a later time. 
E. Civil Suits Against State and Local Governments 
As of September 12, 2011, states faced forty-one pending civil lawsuits challenging 
different state gun laws under the Second Amendment. 75 Although Second Amendment 
challenges in civil suits have generally been unsuccessful, "several courts have cited Heller in 
expressing concern about state action that would limit an individual's right to possess a firearm 
where that person is not prohibited by law from doing so."76 Three significant civil cases have 
acknowledged the individual right to possess a firearm where the individual is legally allowed to 
do so and have joined a minority of cases that have proactively litigated Second Amendment 
claims after Heller. 
One such civil case is Simmons v. Gillespie in which a Plaintiff police officer sued a 
police chief after the chief issued a personnel1nemorandum "prohibiting the officer fron1 
possessing or carrying firearms off-duty without prior authorization from the chief. "77 In his 
complaint, the officer essentially alleged that the chief "had prohibited him, as a condition of his 
employment, from all private, lawful possession and use offirearms."78 Even though the 
officer's co1nplaint did not explicitly include a Second Amendment claim, the court "believed it 
was appropriate, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent in Heller, to construe the 
complaint as encompassing a Second Amend1nent claim instead of requiring the plaintiff to file 
an amended complaint."79 The court determined that the plaintiff had a claim to injunctive relief 
74 State v. Robinson, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 (App. Div. Aug. 23, 2011). 
75 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 4. 
76 Post- Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 5. 
77 Simmons v. Gillespie, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81424 (C.D. Ill. Aug. I, 2008). 
78 Simmons v. Gillespie, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81424 (C. D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2008). 
79 Simmons v. Gillespie, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 81424 (C. D. Ill. Aug. I, 2008). 
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and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss as to the Second Amendn1ent claim. 80 After 
settlement negotiations, the court in 2010 granted the Plaintiff's Petition for Voluntary 
Dismissal. 81 This case is important to note because the District Court found that where the 
individual was not otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm, they therefore should not be 
forbidden to possess that firearm through state action. The police chief had tried to limit the 
employee police officer's possession of a firearm where he was lawfully allowed to have it, and 
the court found that this was a violation of the Second Amendment. 
In another potential victory for gun rights lobbyists, the United States District Court for 
the Central District of Illinois in Mischaga v. Monken denied the dismissal of a plaintiff's suit 
alleging that an Illinois licensing law "violated the Second Amendment by preventing her from 
being able to possess a firearm for self-defense while she stayed in an Illinois friend's home. "82 
In a complaint against the Director of the Illinois State Police, the plaintiff alleged that the 
Illinois Act prohibited her from possessing a weapon for her personal protection at her ten1porary 
residence in Illinois and that the act therefore violated her constitutional right to bear arms. 83 The 
court found that the plaintiff had stated a claim and therefore denied the defendant's n1otion to 
dismiss. 84 This case discusses the breadth of the word "home" that was left untouched in Heller. 
Since the Supreme Court did not specify how far the right to self-defense in the "hon1e" extends, 
it is significant that the District Court did not disn1iss a claim alleging that the right should also 
be applied in a temporary home when staying with a friend. 
80 Simmons v. Gillespie, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81424 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2008). 
81 Simmons v. Gillespie, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75034 (C.D. Ill., July 23, 2010). 
82 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 2011, at 5. 
83 Mishaga v. Monken, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123491 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2010). 
84 Mishaga v. Monken, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123491 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2010). 
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago exmnined a Chicago ordinance to 
determine whether or not it violated the plaintiffs Second Amendment rights. 85 Immediately 
following the decision in McDonald, Chicago's City Council Committee on Police and Fire had 
held a hearing to explore what possible legislative responses were needed following 
McDonald. 86 The Committee made recommendations to the City Council and just four days after 
McDonald was handed down, Chicago's City Council "repealed the City's laws banning 
handgun possession and unanimously adopted the Responsible Gun Owners Ordinance."87 This 
ordinance mandates that anyone who wants to own a gun must complete one hour of range 
training, yet at the same time it prohibits any firing ranges from being within city limits. 88 The 
ordinance further prohibits any handgun possession "outside the home"89 and specifies that any 
gun owner may have "no more than one firearm in his home assembled and operable."90 
The Seventh Circuit held that Heller was instructive,91 and, although the Supreme Court 
had not specified what level of scrutiny to evaluate this type of litigation at, their interpretation 
was that Heller required "any heightened standard of scrutiny."92 Since the ordinance "prohibits 
the 'law-abiding, responsible citizens' of Chicago fro1n engaging in target practice in the 
controlled environment of a firing range,"93 the court concluded that the City bears the burden, 
under this heightened level of scrutiny, of "establishing a strong public-interest justification for 
its ban on range training."94 The City was required to "establish a close fit between the range ban 
85 Ezell v. City ofChicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011). 
86 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEX IS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011 ). 
87 Ezell v. City ofChicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (7th Cir. July 6, 2011). 
88 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEX IS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011 ). 
89 Ezell v. City ofChicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011). 
90 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEX IS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011 ). 
91 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011 ). 
92 Ezell v. City ofChicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011). 
93 Ezell v. City ofChicago, 201 I U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 2011). 
94 Ezell v. City ofChicago, 201 I U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (ih Cir. July 6, 20I 1). 
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and the actual public interest it serves"95 and also had to prove that the "public interests are 
strong enough to justify so substantial an encun1brance on individual Second Amendment 
rights. "96 When the City failed to meet this standard, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for 
further proceedings consistent with their findings. This case recognized the Second An1endment 
rights of law-abiding citizens and did not allow yet another Chicago ban to be upheld. 
F. Going Forward: Further Challenges in Lower Courts 
In the future, gun lobbyists will likely continue to threaten the courts with more litigation 
in an effort to keep state and local governments across the country from enacting more statutes 
that restrict gun rights. 97 Proponents of increased gun rights have been lining up cases to go to 
the Supreme Court that will force the Court to clarify whether the Second Amendment applies 
outside the context of the home.98 
One such case that will be coming up before the Supreme Court is the appeal of the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Masciandaro. 99 In his petition to the Supreme Court, 
Masciandaro argues that "if there is a Second Amendment right outside of the home, it surely 
applies to law-abiding citizens carrying handguns for self-defense while traveling on public 
highways." 100 Masciandaro pled his case in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in front 
of Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III, who stated that "any expansion of the right in Heller would 
have to come from the Supren1e Court." 101 Alan Gura, the litigator who argued the Heller case, 
wrote a brief supporting Masciandaro' s appeal and stated that Masciandaro' s case "provides the 
perfect chance to 'clarify' for recalcitrant lower courts that the Second Amendment 'applies 
95 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 20 II U.S. App. LEX IS 14I 08 (7th Cir. July 6, 20 II). 
96 Ezell v. City ofChicago, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108 (71h Cir. July 6, 20II). 
97 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. I2, 20 II, at 9. 
98 Barnes, supra note __ at 2-3. 
99 Barnes, supra note __ at 2. 
100 Barnes, supra note_ at 2. 
101 Barnes, supra note_ at 2. 
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beyond the threshold of one's home." 102 If the Supreme Court does not take this opportunity to 
clarify its Heller decision, Mr. Gura believes that there will surely be more cases like it on their 
way.J03 
III. Legislation Response: "Guns-at-Work" State Laws Expand Gun Rights for Employees 
Rather than bringing cases before the lower courts in the hopes of reaching the Supreme 
Court, lobbyists for the legislatures responded to the Heller decision by enacting state "Guns-at-
Work" laws. These state laws prohibit employers or business owners fro1n forbidding the 
presence of otherwise lawful guns in locked cars located on business property. 104 Since these 
laws are not preempted by the federal OSH Act, the sixteen states that have enacted the "Guns-
at-Work" laws have essentially expanded gun rights through legislative enactment rather than 
judicial ruling. While the Supreme Court has declined to reach the issue of individual gun rights 
outside of the home, the state legislatures have tackled the issue head on and have given 
individuals the right to carry an otherwise lawful weapon for self-defense outside of the home. 
A. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Proves Inadequate and Ambiguous 
When looking at state legislatures' reactions to Heller and the subsequent "Guns-at-
Work" laws, we must also look at the federal regulations that these laws were meant to clarify, 
most notably the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act). When the 
OSH Act was enacted in 1970, its restrictions brought the federal government into an area that 
generally was controlled by the states. 105 Congress enacted the law because it wanted to ensure 
102 Barnes, supra note_ at 2. 
103 Barnes, supra note_ at 2-3. 
104 Witter, supra note __ at 240. 105 
Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the OSH Act Does Not Preempt 
State Guns-at-Work Laws, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 475,486 (2009) (quoting Gade v. Nat' I Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 
U.S. 88,96 (1992)). 
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that employees were in safe and healthy working conditions. 106 Therefore, the Act in1posed on 
employers an obligation to maintain workplace safety. 107 The two main obligations that the Act 
enacted against employers were compliance with health and safety standards and c01npliance 
with the Act's "general duty clause". 108 This "general duty clause" imposes on every employer a 
duty to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free 
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to 
his employees." 109 The "general duty clause" creates a mandatory requirement for en1ployers and 
is a sort of ""catch alr' for any workplace hazards that are not covered by a specific Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation. 110 
In the context of gun rights, the main speculation about this "general duty clause" is 
whether or not workplace violence prevention is required under the clause. Son1e courts, such as 
the Federal District Court in ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, have found that "gun-related 
workplace violence and the presence of unauthorized firearms on company property" qualify as 
recognized hazards that come under the e1nployer's general duty. 111 The District Court ruled that 
the en1ployer had a general duty because if guns are not banned from the premises, including the 
parking lots, disgruntled employees can easily retrieve firearms. 112 However, in Ramsey Winch 
Inc. v. Henry, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the ConocoPhillips holding 
and ruled that the OSHA "has not indicated in any way that employers should prohibit firearms 
106 Royal, supra note __ at 486. 
107 Royal, supra note __ at 486. 
1os R I oya , supra note __ at 487. . 
109 Royal, supra note __ at 487 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §654(a)(l)). 
110 Perry, supra note __ at 3. 
111 Perry, supra note __ at 4 (quoting ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F.Supp. 2d 1282, 1328 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 
4, 2007)). 
112 Perry, supra note __ at 4 (quoting ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F.Supp. 2d 1282, 1329 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 
4, 2007)). 
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from company parking lots." 113 The court held that the OSHA had "declined a request to 
promulgate a standard banning firearms from the workplace" 114 and although the OSHA is aware 
of the controversy surrounding firearms in the workplace, they have "consciously decided not to 
adopt a standard." 115 
Though it would appear that the sixteen state "Guns-at-Work" laws would be in conflict 
with OSH Acf s ''general duty clause," that is not the case. Employers cannot prevent the 
random, intentional acts of employees and although the OSHA is concerned with increasing 
workplace safety, random acts of violence are not workplace specific. 116 In an attempt to clarify 
any discrepancies regarding workplace violence, the OSHA advised in a letter of interpretation 
exactly what it meant by the "general duty clause." 117 The note stated that where the risk of 
violence is a "recognized hazard," the employer should take reasonable steps to minimize such 
foreseen risks and would be in violation of the OSH Act if he or she did not. 118 On the other 
hand, the random occurrence of violent acts that are not seen as a characteristic of the type of 
employment do not subject an en1ployer to an OSH Act violation. 119 This letter suggests that 
employers would not face liability if they had taken reasonable steps of abatement, such as 
installing metal detectors in their buildings to prevent guns from coming in where workplace 
violence is reasonably foreseeable. 120 Gun activists believe that interpreting the OSH Act this 
way proves not only that the "general duty clause" does not require banning guns frmn en1ployee 
113 Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1206 (1Oth Cir. 2009). 
114 Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1206 (lOth Cir. 2009). 
115 Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1206 (1Oth Cir. 2009). 
116 Royal, supra note __ at 520-52 I. 
117 Royal, supra note __ at 521. 
118 Royal, supra note __ at 521 (quoting Letter from Roger A. Clark, Dir., Directorate of Enforcement Programs, 
Occupational Safety and Health Admin., to John R. Schuller (Dec. 10, 1992), 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show docutY)~nt?p table=INTERPRETA('IONS&p id=20951.) 
119 Royal, supra note __ at 521 (quoting Letter from Roger A. Clark, Dir., Directorate of Enforcement Programs, 
Occupational Safety and Health Admi'n., to John R. Schuller (Dec. 10, 1992), 
~,tJp://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadjsp.show doqml_91J!7P tablc=INTERPRETATIONS&-ILi.Q~2J222J.) 
- Royal, supra note __ at 522. 
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vehicles, but also that the state "Guns-at-Work" laws at not preempted by the "general duty 
clause" of the OSH Act. 
B. State Legislatures Take a Stand: State "Guns-at-Work" Laws 
i. "Guns-at-Work" Laws in General 
The spread of "parking lot" or "bring your gun to work" laws stems in part fron1 the 
landmark Heller decision that struck down Washington, D.C.'s handgun ban. 121 Some businesses 
and employers remain unsure about the future of their potential liability, as the "policies 
designed to ensure safe workplaces clash with the Second An1endment." 122 Employers continue 
to raise concerns both with their duties under the broad "general duty clause" of the OSH Act 
and also with their potential civil liability exposure if an employee is involved in workplace 
violence. 123 In spite of this uncertainty, sixteen state legislatures took a stand for gun rights and 
passed "Guns-at-Work" laws. 124 These laws have been divided into two categories: the more 
severe restrictions and the laws with weaker exceptions. 125 The states with the most severe 
restrictions include Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Oklahon1a. 126 These 
states generally forbid employers from asking etnployees whether or not they have a gun inside 
their car, from prohibiting a person that is legally entitled to possess a firearm locked in their 
vehicle from doing so, and frotn i1nplen1enting a policy that would lin1it an employee's ability to 
121 Stephanie Armour, A 'Bring Your Gun to Work' Movement Builds, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 31, 20 I I, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ I I I 5/b4223038869200.htm. 
122 Stephanie Armour, A 'Bring Your Gun to Work' Movement Builds, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 31,2011, 
http://\vww.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ I I I 5/b4223038869200.htm. 
123 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26,2011, b..lli2:/ihrm-
partners.com/hr-news/%e2%80%9cbrin\!,-YOUr-gun-to-!y_()rk%~_2%80%9d-laws-their-cffect-on-emplovers. 
124 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26, 2011, http://b_rm-
pminers.com/hr-news/%e2%80%9cbring-your-gun-to-work~'ue2%80%9d-laws-their-effect-on-emplovG_r2. 
125 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26, 2011, http://hrm: 
paliners.com/h~:-news/%e2%80%9cbrin!!..-your-gun-tq-work%e2%80%9d-laws-their-effect-on-emplovers. 
126 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26,2011, !1Jtp://hrm-
pariners.com/hr-t]_ews/<Yoe2%80(%9cbring-your-gun-to-!vork(~(J92~'cJ80%9d-lqws-thcir-effe<,:t-on-cmplovg.rii-
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store a firearn1 in their locked vehicle. 127 The remaining ten states have exceptions to the "Guns-
at-Work'' laws and give employers more leeway in their restrictions on employees. 128 These 
states include Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, 
and Utah. 129 
ii. Oklahoma's "Guns-at-Work" Law 
Oklahoma is a state with severe "Guns-at-Work" restrictions and has been in the spotlight 
during much of the controversy over these state enactments. Oklahoma originally enacted its 
''Guns-at-Work" statute in response to a corporation that fired "eight workers at a timber mill in 
southeastern Oklahoma [who] had guns in their vehicles at the mill in violation of [company] 
policy." 130 A principle author of the gun-rights law, Rep. Jerry Ellis, stated that angry workers 
who shoot people in the workplace "are going to do so no matter what laws are enacted." 131 
Oklahoma's "Guns-at-Work" law has brought much controversy and litigation. In the 
case of Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
unanimously ruled that workers in Oklahoma have the constitutional right to keep guns in their 
vehicles parked in their employer's parking lots. 132 Originally, a group of employers had filed a 
lawsuit arguing that the state laws violated the regulations of the OSH Act and although the 
District Court in 2007 agreed, the Tenth Circuit held that the "OSHA regulations are just 
voluntary guidelines and recomn1endations for en1ployers seeking to reduce the risk of 
127 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26,2011, http://hrm-
partners.com/hr-news/%e2%80%9cbring-vour-gun-to-worl..;Yioe2%80%9d-laws-their-ef'fect-on-emplovers. 
128 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26, 2011, http://hrm-
partners.corn/hr-news/%e2%800~'09cbring-vour-gun-to-work%)e2%80%9d-laws-their-etlect-on-emplovers. 
129 
"Bring Your Gun to Work" Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), June 26, 2011, ht_tp://hrn}.::. 
partners.com/hr-news/%e2%80<%9cbring-vour-:gun-to-~voJ:.!s.%e2%80{Yo9d-laws-their-Qffect-on.:::~l!.~y~rs. 
130 Robert Boczkiewicz, Gun Law Gets its Day in Court, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 20, 2008, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/miicle.qspx?cu~ticlel [)=~20081120 . I I A I [)f~NVER 940663. 
131 Robert Boczkiewicz, Gun Law Gets its Day in Court, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 20, 2008, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articlelD"'"20!)8112~ I DENVER940663. 
132 Lydell C. Bridgeford, Court Rejects Ban on Guns in Workplace Parking Lots, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, June 
15, 2009, b.!l_p://cbn.bcncfitncws.com/nc\vs/court-rejccJ::b_~ll}ii:9_n-gwl?-in:__\YOrkplas;s;__-::.J2ill:1sing-loJii::26_~ lf)l~t:l,html. 
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workplace violence in at-risk industries. 133 Because of the number of cases that have already 
surrounded the "Guns-at-Work" laws, it is no surprise that labor and employment attorney James 
P. Anelli predicts that, even though this decision was a victory for employees in the Tenth 
Circuit, there will be even more cases down the road where employees will fight for their 
constitutional right. 134 Anelli proposes that in states without the ''Guns-at-Work" laws, 
employees may argue "that he or she has a constitutional right to carry a firearm in a vehicle [in 
an employer parking lot], particularly in a state where it's legal to carry a firearm in one's 
vehicle." 135 In order to avoid the continued litigation on the subject, the Supreme Court needs to 
make a ruling that either affirms or denies an individual's right to bear arms not only locked in 
their vehicle at work, but also outside of the home in general. 
iii. Florida's Legislation 
Akin to Oklahoma, Florida adopted severe "Guns-at-Work" legislation that lin1its the 
restrictions employers can place on employees regarding guns in locked vehicles in company 
parking lots. Prior to even adopting this legislation, 136 the bill's sponsor, Rep. Dennis Baxley, 
argued that the bill was simply an extension of the Second Amendment right to bear arn1s and 
was meant to protect employees during their cmn1nute to and from their place ofbusiness. 137 
Baxley, the owner of a company with close to 70 e1nployees, further explained prior to the 
. adoption of the legislation that although he understands the concerns business owners have, he 
doesn't believe that the employer's property rights can trump the individual's Second 
133 Lydell C. Bridgeford, Court Rejects Ban on Guns in Workplace Parking Lots, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, June 
15, 2009, h!Jp://ebn.benefitnews.com/ne\vs/c;oUJi-reject-b~tns-on-guns-in-workplace-parking-lots-268lJl24-l .html. 
134 Lydell C. Bridgeford, Court Rejects Ban on Guns in Workplace Parking Lots, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, June 
15, 2009, http://ebn.benefitnews._com/D_.Q.yvs/coUJi-reject-b~_ti1s-on-guns-in-workp_l_ace-parking-lots-268 [024-1 .htm I. 
135 Lydell C. Bridgeford, Court Rejects Ban on Guns in Workplace Parking Lots, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, June 
15, 2009, hl!.t.r//ebn.benefitnews.com/news/court-reject-bzms-on-guns-i_n-workplace-parking-lots-268 I 024-l.html. 
136 H.B. 129, 108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006). 
137 Kasey Wehrum, Debate Rages Over Guns at Work: A New Bill That Would Forbid Employers From Banning 
Guns is Drawing Fire, lNC., Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.in_c.com/news/articles/_200602/guns_,html. 
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Amendment rights to self-protection. 138 In 2008, the Florida "Guns-at-Work" statute was 
enacted. 139 It specifically prohibits employers from preventing customers, employees, or invitees 
from possessing legally owned firearms locked in vehicles in parking lots when lawfully in the 
area.
140 Under the statute, employers cannot take action against employees based on statements 
about firearms they may have in their vehicles, and employers cannot condition en1ploy1nent on 
. . h fi 141 an agreement not to mmntmn sue 1rearms. 
In Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Florida was asked to determine whether Florida's "Guns-at-Work" statute was 
preempted by the OSH Act. 142 The Florida District Court found that the statute is not preempted 
by the OSH Act by concluding that the OSH Act applies to permit the states to regulate 143 and 
generally acknowledged that state laws can be used to decide any occupational safety or heath 
issue when there is not a controlling federal standard. 144 This is extretnely important because the 
court essentially ruled that the OSH Act left to the states the task of governing the possession of 
guns in the workplace. Since there is not a federal standard "governing the prevention of 
workplace violence relevant to 'Guns-at-Work' laws," the statute as enacted in Florida is 
. d 14'i perm1tte . -
iv. Indiana: Parking Lot 2.0 
138 Kasey Wehrum, Debate Rages Over Guns at Work: A New Bill That Would Forbid Employers From Banning 
Guns is Drawing Fire, INC., Feb. I 0, 2006, http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200602/guns.html. 
139 Fla. State. §790.251 (4)(a). 
140 Royal, supra note __ at 496 (quoting Fla. State. §790.251 (4)(a)). 
141 Royal, supra note __ at 496 (quoting Fla. State. §790.251 ( 4)(a)). 
142 Royal, supra note __ at 505. 
143 Royal, supra note __ at 506 (quoting Fla. Retain, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99). 
144 Royal, supra note __ at 508 (See 29 U.S.C. §667 (a) and Occupational and Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 18(a)). 
145 Royal, supra note __ at 508. 
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Despite criticism from businesses and 1naj or employers, Indiana's "Guns-at-Work" 
statute went into effect on July 1, 2010 after sailing through both legislative chambers. 146 Indiana 
Governor Mitchel Daniels stated that he signed the legislation because of the "clear gun-rights 
language in federal and state constitutions and the 'overwhelming consensus' in the House and 
Senate." 147 He did, however, add that the General Assembly "might consider ironing out 
ambiguities to prevent unnecessary litigation." 148 Unlike the Supreme Court, Daniels wanted to 
clarify any unanswered questions that the legislation would bring about in order to save judicial 
resources. 
In 20 11, the NRA pushed for a new legislation that would allow employers "to be sued if 
they require applicants to disclose information about gun ownership or require employees to 
reveal if they have weapons or an11nunition in their cars." 149 The bill was authored by State 
Senator Johnny Nugent and labeled "the Parking Lot 2.0 bill" by the NRA. 150 Nugent explained 
his support of the bill by stating that although he understands how employers feel the way that 
they do, there are "things that trump property rights, and one ofthen1 is the defense of (my) 
life." 151 The 2010 bill had failed to address specifically what employers could do "to find out if 
their workers had guns in their cars, or what action they could take to verify those guns were 
146 Florida Federal Court Rules Employees May Leave Guns in Cars While at Work, JACKSON LEWIS LLP, Aug. 8, 
2008, http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?Newsl [)-:-::: 1457. 
147 Florida Federal Court Rules Employees May Leave Guns in Cars While at Work, JACKSON LEWIS LLP, Aug. 8, 
2008, http://www.jackson lewis.com/resources.php?NewslDc-: 1457. 
148 Florida Federal Court Rules Employees May Leave Guns in Cars While at Work, JACKSON LEWIS LLP, Aug. 8, 
2008, http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsiD= 1457. 
149 Maureen Hayden, Challenges Arise to Indiana's 'Parking Lot' Gun Law: Bill Targets Employers Who Demand 
Info From Employees, TRIBST AR, Jan. 28, 20 11, http:/ [Uih~t£!J~.com/i od ian a legislature/ x 1 3 563 0 126/~~hall eng_es-arise_: 
to- I ndiana-s-12ark ing-lot -gun-law. 
150 Maureen Hayden, Challenges Arise to Indiana's 'Parking Lot' Gun Law: Bill Targets Employers Who Demand 
Info From Employees, TRIBSTAR, Jan. 28, 2011, hnp://trjb_~tar.com/indianalegislature/x 135630! 26/Ch<!Jienges-arise-
to-1 nd iana-s-park ing-lot -gun-law. 
151 Maureen Hayden, Challenges Arise to Indiana's 'Parking Lot' Gun Law: Bill Targets Employers Who Demand 
Info From Employees, TRIBSTAR, Jan. 28, 2011, http://tribstar.com/indianalegislaturch; 135630 126/~JJlllL~ll~-ari~~: 
to-1 nd iana-Sj)arking -lot-gun-law. 
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legally pern1itted." 152 Employers were taking advantage of the vague statute and creating 
separate parking areas for employers who carried guns to work in their cars and even began 
asking employees for more information about the guns that they were bringing. 153 The NRA 
lobbyists argued that citizens "'have a constitutional right to self-protection that doesn't stop 
when they drive onto their employer's property" 154 and subsequently pushed for the more 
restrictive "'Parking Lot 2.0" bill. On April 15, 2011, Governor Daniels signed into law the 
Senate Enrolled Act 411 (known as the "'Parking Lot 2.0" bill). 155 
Indiana's new employee protection legislation "'prevents workplace discri1nination for 
those employees who exercise their Second An1endment rights before and after work." 156 With 
this new statute, businesses and employers can no longer ask their en1ployees about private 
firearm ownership habits, what firearms are in their vehicle, or what the serial nun1ber is of their 
firearm. 157 There was no serious opposition for the new bill in the state Senate or House, and it 
went into effect on July 1, 2011. 158 By enacting this statute, the state legislature stood up for 
152 Maureen Hayden, Challenges Arise to Indiana's 'Parking Lot' Gun Law: Bill Targets Employers Who Demand 
Info From Employees, TRIBSTAR, Jan. 28, 2011, http://tribstar.com/indianalegislaturc/xl_35630 126/Challengcs-:.m·isc-
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Info From Employees, TRIBSTAR, Jan. 28, 2011, http:/itrib~lar.com/ingianalegislaturc/~_135630 126(Chqll<;nges-arise-
to- Indiana-s-pctrking-lot-gun-law. 
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Second Amendment rights of employees to protect themselves on their commute to and fr01n 
work. 
IV. Conclusion: The Supreme Court Needs to Take an Affirmative Stance 
The Second Atnendment to the United States Constitution states that "a well-regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed." 159 There are two ways that citizens have interpreted these words: 
(1) that individuals have an unfettered right to own firearms; or (2) that states are n1erely able to 
maintain militias in order to protect against a tyrannical federal government. 160 Until 2008, the 
Supreme Court had not ruled on this controversy. However, in Heller, the Court held that the 
Second A1nendment protects an individual's right to bear arms. This brought about not only 
increasing gun rights litigation, but also numerous state laws that gave employees the right to 
store otherwise legal handguns in their vehicles in their employer's private parking lot. Gun-
rights lobbyists support an expansive reading of the Second Amendment that they say was 
signaled by Heller and have been convincing judges and state legislatures to read the decision 
expansively as well. 161 The Heller and McDonald decisions have played key roles in both the 
state "Guns-at-Work" statutes and the recent litigation that continues to challenge gun 
restrictions nationwide. If not for both of these decisions, advocates of the "Guns-at-Work" laws 
would not have much of a leg to stand on when arguing their rights under the Second 
Amend1nent. 
Even with the legislative enactments expanding gun rights at the workplace, the Supreme 
Court needs to define Second Amendment rights and put an end to the costly litigation that has 
been trying to answer Heller's unanswered questions for years. If the Supreme Court n1eant its 
159 Perry, supra note __ at 5. 
160 Perry, supra note __ at 5. 
161 w· Itter, supra note __ at 240. 
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two holdings to apply beyond possession of a firearn1 in one's home, it will need to state that 
outright rather than avoiding the subject. 162 It was clear from the moment the decision was 
handed down that "much litigation would be needed to define the contours of Justice Antonin 
Scalia's majority opinion in Heller." 163 The Supreme Court cannot simply give a limited 
definition to Second Amendment rights and then wait while the lower courts argue back and 
forth, draining judicial resources and providing inconsistent holdings. After taking a stance in 
both Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court needs to take their holding a step further and 
define how far the right to bear arms extends outside of the home. 
During the ongoing litigation stemming from Heller and McDonald, state legislatures in 
Indiana, Florida, Oklahoma, and thirteen other states have chosen not to rely on previous federal 
enactments such as the OSH Act and instead have created their own statutes that protect gun 
rights for self-defense outside of the home. They have chosen to take the power that the Supreme 
Court has so far refused to exercise and have expanded Second Amendment rights to include 
self-defense outside of the hon1e by permitting employees to possess guns in their car during 
their comn1ute to the workplace. Currently, sixteen states have '"Guns-at-Work" statutes and 
there is no telling what other legislation will come into effect due to pressures from gun rights 
activists. With this type of disconnect between judicial rulings and the legislature's approach, it 
is important that the Supreme Court accept one of the many cases being petitioned before it and 
take the opportunity to define exactly how far the individual's right to bear arms extends. Due to 
the overwhelming need for clarification in the judicial branch, the Supreme Court needs to 
follow the state legislatures' example and take an affin11ative position on this significant Second 
Amend1nent issue. 
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